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Abstract  
 
For most of the twentieth century, collective bargaining provided the terms on which 
labour was commonly employed in Britain. However, the quarter century since 1980 
has seen the collapse of collectivism as the main way of regulating employment. Our 
argument is that the tacit settlement between organized labour and employers was 
undermined by increasing product market competition. The paper first provides an 
overview of the changing map of collective bargaining, focusing on the private sector. 
It then moves on to ask why the retreat took place, and to explore the part played by 
product market competition and, in particular, by the profitability of different 
industries. The paper concludes with an analysis of the consequences of privatisation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
A remarkable feature of the period after 1980 was the collapse of collectivism as the 
main way of regulating employment. Collective bargaining had hitherto, for most of 
the twentieth century, provided the terms on which labour was commonly employed 
in Britain. Employers, whether or not they dealt directly with trade unions themselves, 
generally followed agreements that had been made with unions. But the quarter 
century since 1980 saw this fall apart. This paper is concerned with how and why this 
happened. 
 
The theory that guides our account of this upheaval focuses on the central importance 
of the markets in which employers trade. The more competitive these product markets 
are, the smaller are the profits potentially accessible to trade unions. Having profits 
for unions to bargain over may be a necessary condition for collective bargaining, but 
it is not sufficient. What is also needed is a trade union organisation that is strong 
enough to make that bargaining effective. Here the product market becomes important 
again, because the environment in which unions are best able to flourish is one where 
the employers of their members face relatively slack competitive pressures. Tougher 
competition forces employers to tighten their control over employment, of which 
reducing the leeway for unions and reducing their influence over the conduct of work 
is a part. It was a feature of our period that product market competition tightened for 
much of the private sectori. Privatisation had similar effects in the public sector. Our 
story concerns the consequences for collective bargaining. 
 
Until the early 1980s, collective bargaining had been unquestioningly accepted by 
employers, unions and governments.  Proposals for reform were predicated on the 
assumption that, while collective bargaining may have to be modified, employers 
would continue to face trade unions across the bargaining table. Back in 1980 the 
majority of large employers entered into voluntary agreements with trade unions, not 
simply because unions had the bargaining power to make life difficult for them if they 
did not, but also because collective bargaining served the interests of employers.  
Even if collective bargaining entailed paying a rate for the job that may have 
exceeded a notional market-set wage, this was perceived to be a price worth paying if 
most or all competitors also paid collectively bargained rates. To use the traditional 
phrase, collective bargaining ‘took wages out of competition’ and allowed employers 
to focus their attention on other matters. 
 
Our argument is that this tacit settlement between organized labour and employers 
was undermined by increasing product market competition. Over our quarter-century 
the British economy became substantially more open in terms of both trade and 
ownership. Employers were increasingly forced to reconsider collective bargaining 
habits that hitherto had been taken for granted. We start our investigation of how they 
did it with an overview of the changing map of collective bargaining, focusing on the 
private sector. Where and when did the historic retreat take place? We then move on 
to asking why, and to explore the part played by product market competition and, in 
particular, by the profitability of different industries. The paper concludes with an 
analysis of the consequences of privatisation, which can be seen as an extreme case of 
product market change. Tougher competition in the markets within which employers 
compete, it will be argued, has been the driving force behind the weakening of their 
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employees’ trade unions. It lay behind the undermining of the collective bargaining 
arrangements that they had built up over the previous century. 
 
MAPPING THE CONTRACTION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
 
The Webb’s classic definition of collective bargaining is that it occurs when the 
employer ‘…meets with a collective will, and settles, in a single agreement, the 
principles on which, for the time being, all workmen of a particular group, or class, or 
grade, will be engaged’ (Webb and Webb, 1902: 173). Over a hundred years later the 
term has come to be used more broadly. Collective bargaining in Britain rarely results 
in a single agreement. For any particular workplace it is rather a constantly changing 
bundle of written and unwritten agreements and understandings.  
 
The British experience is internationally distinctive in this respect, with none of the 
apparatus of legal enforcement that is to be found, for example, in the United States or 
many European countries. The century and a half during which legal enforcement 
was, by mutual agreement, effectively excluded from collective bargaining in Britain 
encouraged what has always been a relatively informal, parochial set of arrangements, 
varying substantially by both sector and workplace. As elsewhere, the ‘principles’ of 
engagement extend far beyond pay and hours of work. But, in the British context, any 
formal dialogue that takes place between employers and representatives of 
independent trade unions, that has an influence on the employment relationship, can 
be taken to constitute collective bargaining. It is, as a result, an elusive concept at the 
margin, made more so by the fact that perceptions of employers and trade union 
representatives differ substantially over what is bargaining and what is consultation  
(Brown and Nash, 2008: 100). We here consider two different defining 
characteristics: employer recognition and pay bargaining. Both can be mapped using 
the series of Workplace Industrial / Employment Relations Surveys, which took place 
in 1980, 1984, 1990, 1998 and 2004 among workplaces with 25 or more employees 
(Millward et al, 2000; Kersley et al, 2006). 
 
One indicator of collective bargaining is whether or not employers say they recognise 
trade unions for negotiating pay and conditions. It is a question that has been asked 
from the start of the surveys and, as Table 1 indicates, there was a substantial 
reduction in recognition over the whole period. But the trends are very different for 
the public and private sectors. While union recognition remained a normal part of life 
for most of the public sector, in the private sector it collapsed from being a feature of 
a half of workplaces to under a quarter. Although fairly stable at the start and finish of 
our period, it is the halving of recognition in the private sector between the 1984 and 
1998 surveys that stands out. This was rarely, it should be added, the consequence of 
employers’ aggressively and actively derecognising trade unions. Instead it reflected 
in part a tendency not to recognise unions in newly established workplaces, and an 
inability of unions to extend recognition among continuing workplaces as they aged 
and grew larger (Millward, Bryson and Forth, 2000: 100). In part it also reflected a 
process of what has been called ‘implicit derecognition’, whereby individual 
employers gradually reduced the range of issues and the intensity with which they 
engaged with unions to the point at which recognition was nebulous (Brown et al., 
1998). As the 1980s and 1990s progressed, employers, and a new generation of 
managers, apparently found that they could function perfectly adequately with less 
involvement with trade union representatives than in the past.  
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Table 1 – Percentage of workplaces with 25+ employees recognising unions 1980-
2004  
 
 1980 
% 
1984 
% 
1990 
% 
1998 
% 
2004 
% 
All 64 66 53 41 38 
Public sector 94 99 87 87 87 
Private sector 50 48 38 24 22 
 
Base: workplaces with 25 or more employees 
Source: Workplace Employment Relations Survey series 
 
Change in pay-fixing
Just what it means for an employer to say that they recognise trade unions for some of 
their employees is unclear. What action, if any, follows? Do they do no more than 
accept that unions may represent workers with individual grievances? Or, at the other 
end of a spectrum, is the union a firmly institutionalised part of the decision-making 
process, involved by right in pay fixing and work organisation? So let us consider the 
relatively concrete issue of whether employers rely on collective bargaining for the 
purpose of fixing pay for some or all of their employees. This reliance may mean no 
more than that they follow the terms of a collective agreement for their industry that 
has been concluded by relatively remote union and employer association officials. Or 
it may mean something much more proximal and immediate, with union 
representatives among the firm’s employees taking the lead in negotiating the pay of 
its workforce. 
 
The changing picture of pay fixing arrangements since 1984 is summarised in Table 
2.ii This provides both the percentage of workplaces where collective bargaining is 
used for some part of the workforce and the total percentage of employees who are 
covered by these arrangements. The overall story of change for the whole economy, 
and of marked divergence between public and private sectors, is in line with what we 
have already noted for trade union recognition. Between industrial sectors, which 
include both private and public enterprises, there are clear variations in both the extent 
and timing of collective bargaining’s retreat. For some sectors characterised by long 
bargaining traditions - engineering, metals, and other manufacturing, transport and 
communications - the greatest retreat from collective bargaining was in the 1980s and 
1990s. There are signs of the retreat slowing or even ceasing in the 2000s, at least in 
terms of the proportion of employees covered. For extraction and refining, by 
contrast, that proportion continued to decline, despite only a small change in the 
workplace incidence of bargaining in this sector, implying that some large firms 
abandoned it. For other sectors however, notably construction, distribution and 
hospitality, and banking and finance, the retreat has been steady and sustained over 
the whole twenty-year period. 
 
 4
Table 2 – Percentage of workplaces with 25+ employees with some collective 
bargaining and the percentage of all employees covered 1984-2004  
Cell percentages 
 Workplaces with any collective 
bargaining 
Employees in workplaces with any 
collective bargaining 
 1984 1990 1998 2004 1984 1990 1998 2004 
Public sector 99 86 84 82 95 78 67* 79 
Private sector  47 38 24 16 52 41 32 25 
All 66 52 40 32 70 54 42 39 
Energy, water 
supply 
94 96 96 95 93 85 89 83 
Extraction, metals, 
minerals, 
chemicals 
53 60 47 46 72 62 54 37 
Metal goods, 
engineering, 
vehicles 
53 38 32 27 67 48 46 45 
Other 
manufacturing 
59 45 34 31 60 52 40 38 
Construction 54 46 37 22 53 45 38 30 
Distribution, 
hospitality, repairs 
40 27 17  7 39 22 22 13 
Transport, 
communications 
88 73 60 63 91 80 63 66 
Banking,  finance, 
insurance, business 
services. 
50 44 26 12 45 38 23 17 
Other services 86 73 59 53 86 68 52* 58 
* The fall in the percentage reflects temporary changes in the relative influence of Pay Review Bodies 
and collective bargaining, especially in the NHS – see Millward et al (2000: 195) and Kersley et al 
(2006:185) 
 
 
The changed incidence of bargaining 
Having noted the distinctive experience of the private sector, let us explore this 
further. Multivariate analysis permitted us to unravel some of the many factors 
associated with employers’ propensity to engage in collective bargaining. Some of the 
more substantial relationships are summarised in Table 3. The table presents two 
models estimated for the pooled years 1984-2004.  The first is estimated for the whole 
private sector.  The second focuses on ‘trading workplaces’ - that is, those involved in 
the selling of goods or services as opposed to those which are depots, administrative 
centres and the like. The models identify independent associations between workplace 
characteristics, on the one hand, and, on the other, the use of collective bargaining to 
set pay for at least some workers at the workplace (whatever the level at which 
bargaining occurs: national, sectoral, organizational or workplace).  Coefficients in 
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the models indicate percentage differences in the probability of coverage relative to 
the reference category specified in the table. In addition to these pooled year models, 
we ran separate year regressions to see how the association between collective 
bargaining and workplace characteristics had altered over time. 
 
Table 3 – The occurrence of collective bargaining within private sector 
establishments - regression (OLS) with specific characteristics for pooled data 
for 1984, 1990, 1998, 2004 
 
  1- all private sector 
workplaces 
 2-trading workplaces in 
the private sector 
Establishment size 
(reference <50): 
    
50 - 99  n.s.  n.s. 
100 - 199  0.10**  0.11** 
200 - 499  0.15**  0.16** 
500+  0.20**  0.21** 
Single establishment  -0.08**  -0.09** 
Organisation size 
(reference <1000): 
    
 
1000 - 9999  0.18**  0.18** 
10,000 +   0.30**  0.27** 
     
Age >10 years  0.08**  0.10** 
Proportion female  -0.12**  -0.14** 
Proportion non-
manual
 -0.08**  -0.05* 
Survey year 
(reference 1984): 
1990 
1998 
2004 
 
Product market 
(reference ‘local’): 
  
 
-0.11** 
-0.21** 
-0.29** 
  
 
-0.12** 
-0.23** 
-0.29** 
regional    -0.12** 
national    -0.11** 
international    -0.12** 
Observations  4507  3321 
R-squared  0.26  0.29 
     
Notes:    
(1)  The dependent variable is available in the data set deposited at the data archive (SN 4511) 
(2) Models include controls for region (10 dummies), industry (9 dummies), foreign ownership, 
proportion part-time employees.   
(3) Analyses are weighted with workplace survey weights. 
(4)  ** denotes statistically significant at a 95% confidence interval or above.  * denotes statistical 
significance at a 90% confidence interval.  
(5) Probit estimation made no substantial difference to the results. 
(6) Full models are available from the authors on request. 
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The models account for around one-quarter of the variance in the incidence of 
collective bargaining in the private sector.  Although this is a sizeable proportion, and 
quite respectable for analyses of this sort, it does mean that roughly three-quarters of 
the variance remains unexplained. Industry, region, the size of the workplace, 
organization size, workplace age, and the composition of the workplace’s workforce 
were all independently associated with the likelihood that at least some workers had 
their pay set by collective bargaining.  The industry effects (not shown) reflect the 
descriptive information in Table 2, with workplaces in the Energy and Water sector 
most likely to use collective bargaining followed by Transport and Communication.  
Distribution, Hotels and Catering was by far the least likely to use collective 
bargaining.  These industry effects are interesting for two reasons.  First, they are 
fairly persistent over time, as we find when running the models on separate years.  
Second, they are independent of workplace and organization size effects, indicating 
that these industry effects capture something distinctive about the working 
environment and industrial traditions, over and above organizational size.   
 
Workplace size was strongly associated with the propensity of private sector 
employers to use collective bargaining. Although this is far from a novel finding, it 
merits deeper investigation. Controlling for other factors, workplaces with 500 or 
more employees were around one-fifth more likely to use collective bargaining than 
comparable (in terms of the characteristics listed) workplaces with fewer than 50 
employees. Having allowed for workplace size, simply being part of a larger, multi-
workplace organization substantially increased the probability that a workplace used 
collective bargaining.  Single-independent organizations had an 8 per cent lower 
probability of using collective bargaining than workplaces belonging to multi-site 
firms.  Furthermore, the probability that the largest organizations – those with 10,000 
or more employees – used collective bargaining was 30 per cent higher than otherwise 
comparable organizations with fewer than 1,000 employees. Once again, the 
individual year regressions indicate that these size effects are fairly persistent across 
time.  In brief, collective bargaining was continuing to play an important role in 
determining the pay of at least some of the workers in larger private sector 
organizations at the start of the twenty-first century. 
 
The incidence of collective bargaining is also independently associated with 
workplace age. Over the course of the WERS series, workplaces aged ten years or 
more had a higher probability of using collective bargaining than otherwise 
comparable younger workplaces.  In 1998 and 2004 we have continuous information 
on the age of the workplace which allows us to identify when it was born.  Among 
private sector workplaces surveyed in 1998, 45 per cent of those born in the 1940s or 
earlier used collective bargaining.  The figure was half this (23 per cent) among 
workplaces born in the 1960s.  The percentage was half again (12 per cent) among 
workplaces born in the 1980s.  Assuming that employers choose whether or not to use 
collective bargaining to set pay early on in the lives of workplaces, these figures 
suggest a substantial decline in the adoption of collective bargaining between the 
1950s and 1960s and again between the 1970s and 1980s.  Among those workplaces 
surveyed in 2004 the big decline took place between the 1960s and 1970s: among 
those born in the 1960s 32 per cent were still using collective bargaining in 2004.  The 
figure was only one-third of this (13 per cent) among those born in the 1970s.  Thus,       
although it is not possible from this analysis to distinguish between a pure age effect 
and a cohort effect - that is, an effect associated with the historical date of birth of the 
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workplace rather than its age per se – the evidence is suggestive of substantial 
declines in the adoption of collective bargaining in the three decades after the Second 
World War.  It appears, therefore, that Margaret Thatcher’s governments of the 1980s 
and 1990s may have taken credit for dismantling collective bargaining when, in fact, 
the demise of collective bargaining was already well-advanced.  In any event, it is 
clear that the “golden age” for union pay bargaining was just after the Second World 
War, as Millward et al. (2000: 103) have suggested.    
 
What about the workers who might be the beneficiaries of collective bargaining? 
Have their characteristics been related to its retreat? Table 3 shows that the propensity 
of private sector employers to use collective bargaining to determine wages does 
depend, in part, on the type of workers they employ.  Their use of collective 
bargaining falls with increases in the proportion both of women and of non-manual 
workers they employ.  The presence of part-time workers does not register as 
significant. We know from national surveys that trade union membership has tended 
to decline more in what were once characterised as manual as opposed to non-manual 
occupations (Grainger and Crowther, 2007: 6). Union membership has become 
increasingly associated with those workers with more qualifications rather than with 
those in less-skilled jobs. Our multivariate analysis for separate years suggests that 
withdrawal from collective bargaining reflects a comparable phenomenon. That is, the 
effects of the occupational composition of the workforce diminished over time so that, 
by 2004, it was no longer a significant factor influencing the employer’s propensity to 
use collective bargaining.  For anyone concerned about the protection of employment 
standards, the notable implication is that it has been those workers whose comparative 
lack of skills made them more dependent upon collective bargaining who have been 
the greatest losers. It is thus not only that the protections of collective bargaining have 
been withdrawn from a growing proportion of the British workforce; they have been 
withdrawn disproportionately from the workers who needed them most. 
 
Distinctive regional differences will be of interest to labour historians aware of deep-
rooted variations in local traditions of collectivism. Collective bargaining has not been 
abandoned uniformly across Britain. By comparison with the South-East, and 
allowing for differences in industrial structure, workplace size, and so on, Scotland 
and the North-West were significantly more likely to use collective bargaining to fix 
pay.  The separate year regressions indicate that these differences have persisted over 
the last quarter century.  However, there was greater regional variance in the use of 
collective bargaining in 1984 than there was in 2004.  In 1984 employers in Wales, 
the West Midlands and Yorkshire and Humberside were all more likely than 
employers in the South East to set pay via collective bargaining, but these differences 
had disappeared as early as 1990. In summary, distinctive local traditions of 
collectivism appear to be in decline. 
 
A substantial change that might have affected collective bargaining has been the 
growth of overseas ownership. Between 1981 and 2004, the proportion of shares 
owned by investors outside Britain rose from 4 per cent to 36 per cent. Multi-national 
companies may import their managerial style when taking over domestic firms, and so 
foreign ownership might be expected to be a relevant factor in determining whether an 
employer uses collective bargaining.  Has the remarkable growth in foreign ownership 
over our period been one of the factors driving out collective bargaining? It has not. 
Foreign ownership was not a statistically significant factor in the incidence of 
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collective bargaining in any of the separate year analyses, nor in the pooled years’ 
regression.   
 
To what extent does the shrinking of collective bargaining simply reflect the changing 
structure of the economy? Is it mainly a consequence of the collapse of many of its 
traditional heartlands? A common assertion is that union decline is due in large part to 
the decline both of the manufacturing industry and of the large workplaces that were 
once so conducive to union organization.  We can use the separate year models to 
estimate the probability of collective bargaining, making the artificial supposition that 
variables such as industrial distribution and size had remained constant over time.  In 
this way we can establish how much of the 29 percentage point decline in the 
incidence of collective bargaining in the private sector is due to change in these 
observable characteristics, as opposed to change that takes place within these 
characteristics.   
 
The remarkable result is that only around one-tenth of the decline in the workplace 
incidence of collective bargaining in the private sector is due to compositional change.  
The remaining nine-tenths is due to within-group change, which might be interpreted 
as a change in, for example, employer and employee preferences and other factors that 
are independent of the observable characteristics of the workplace we included in our 
analysis.  We can thus confidently reject the proposition that compositional change in 
the economy has played a major part in diminishing the role of collective bargaining 
in Britain.   
 
We might speculate that workplaces adopting collective bargaining in the more hostile 
environment of the 1980s and 1990s did so with less commitment than those where it 
was already established. It may be that the form of collective bargaining adopted in 
the late 1990s and 2000s, when ‘workplace partnership’ was strongly advocated by 
the TUC, was more shallow-rooted than the typically more confrontational form that 
employers had faced before. Certainly case studies in the early 2000s suggested that, 
unless there were high levels of union membership, worker influence tended to be 
superficial and partnership fragile (Oxenbridge and Brown, 2004). Employers had 
adjusted to relatively settled policies towards collective bargaining. For many it was 
of a more co-operative ‘partnership’ form than would have been the case twenty years 
earlier.  
 
But, however settled this less confrontational form of collective bargaining may now 
appear to be, the disturbing implication of the data for private sector trade unionists is 
that the decline in coverage of collective bargaining does not appear to have lost 
momentum.  This is apparent from the survey year coefficients in Table 2.3. Having 
accounted for observable workplace characteristics, the probability that a workplace 
set pay for at least some of its workers using collective bargaining fell by 29 per cent 
between 1984 and 2004.  This is only a little smaller than the change in raw 
percentages presented in Table 2.  The decline of around 8 per cent between 1998 and 
2004 is statistically significant and implies an annual rate of decline not very different 
from that estimated for the 1990s.iii  The decline in trade union membership that had 
commenced in 1980 may have been ‘plateauing out’ by the start of the twenty-first 
century, but collective bargaining was continuing to retreat. 
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The coverage of workers 
We have identified trends in the incidence of collective bargaining and its correlates, 
but how does this translate into the percentage of workers covered by collective 
bargaining?  This is depicted in Figure 1.  It shows a steady decline in bargaining 
coverage across all three major sectors of the economy between 1984 and 2004.  This 
continued in the private sector through to 2004, whereas coverage in the public sector 
recovered a little, due in large part to collective bargaining in the Health Service over 
changes in terms and conditions arising from the Agenda for Change initiative 
(Kersley et al., 2006: 185).  At the start of the period, seven-in-ten workers across the 
economy had their pay set through collective bargaining.  This had slumped to four-
in-ten twenty years later.iv  In manufacturing, coverage declined by a third over the 
twenty years. In the growing private services sector, it halved. 
 
Figure 1: Percentage of Employees Covered By Collective Bargaining, 1984-2004 
 
% employees covered by collective bargaining
0
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3  Public sector
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Note: workplaces with 25+ employees 
 
 
What form does the contraction of collective bargaining coverage take at the 
workplace? With WERS we are able to go a stage further than household surveys 
such as the Labour Force Survey by observing the distribution of employee collective 
bargaining coverage within workplaces.  Focusing once again on the private sector, 
collective bargaining has tended to become an ‘all or nothing’ feature of workplaces. 
As its coverage diminishes, so employers tend increasingly to polarise between those 
who use it for most of their workforce, and those who have abandoned it altogether. 
Private sector workplaces where a minority of workers are covered are becoming a 
rarity. Between 1984 and 2004, for example, the proportion of workplaces with any 
collective bargaining fell from 47 per cent to 16 per cent. Where collective bargaining 
did take place, the proportion of workplaces for which it encompassed 80 per cent or 
more of the workplace rose from 58 per cent in 1984 to 77 per cent in 2004. But the 
proportion of those where fewer than 50 per cent of workers were covered fell from 
14 per cent to 8 per cent. It has become harder for a trade union to maintain a minority 
presence in a workplace.  
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This polarisation in union presence at the workplace is partly a consequence of the 
change in the level at which pay fixing decisions are made, which in part reflects a 
change in the structure of bargaining. On the one hand, employers have tended to 
move towards comprehensive pay-fixing arrangements for their workplaces, whether 
or not those involve collective bargaining (Kersley et al. 2006: 184). On the other 
hand, we have seen the demise of the sort of multi-employer, industrial agreements 
that might, for example, provide a basis for pay for a minority who are skilled 
craftsmen within a workplace which otherwise fixed pay without union involvement. 
To this we now turn. 
 
The changing level of pay-fixing decisions 
We have discussed the retreat from collective bargaining in the private sector. The 
closely related question is at what organisational level decisions about pay were made, 
whether or not they resulted from bargaining or from management dictat. Until the 
1960s, a patchwork of industrial agreements dominated private sector pay fixing in 
Britain. Employer organisations and trade unions negotiated agreements that covered 
whole sectors – carpet-making, electrical contracting, ship-building, and so on – on 
behalf of their member employers. Most of these agreements were nationwide in 
coverage. A controversial feature of multi-employer bargaining by the 1960s had been 
the increasing tendency for employers to augment the industrial agreements to which 
they were committed with locally bargained additions. In many sectors, the pay rates 
arising from national agreements would be added to in various ad hoc and informal 
ways – such as piecework pay, merit rates, factory bonuses, questionable overtime 
pay and so on. Indeed, the consequent phenomenon, known as ‘wage drift’, and the 
high level of workplace disputes that accompanied it, had been a central concern of a 
Royal Commission of the 1960s into Britain’s industrial relations malaise.  
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Table 4 – Principal locus of pay decision-making in the private sector (by 
percentage of workplaces covered)  
 
 1984 
% 
1990 
% 
1998 
% 
2004
% 
     
                                        Collective bargaining total % 39 30 16 14 
      of which:     
      Multi-employer bargaining 18 9 3 3 
      Multi-site, single-employer bargaining 13 15 9 7 
      Workplace-level (single-employer) bargaining 8 6 4 3 
     
     
                                 Not collective bargaining total % 59 69 79 85 
      of which:     
      External to organisation (e.g. wages council) 10 6 6 2 
      Higher management within organisation 17 20 30 37 
      Management at the workplace 32 43 43 46 
     
      Don’t know 2 2 5 1 
                                                                           total  % 100 101 100 100 
Notes: 
(1) The table identifies the level at which decisions are made for the pay method covering the most 
workers at the workplace.  If a majority of workers at the workplace had their pay determined via 
collective bargaining they are identified as ‘collective bargaining’ workplaces otherwise they are 
labelled ‘not collective bargaining’. 
(2) Private sector workplaces with 25+ employees. 
 
 
Then, from the 1960s onwards, and with gathering pace, employers began to break 
away from these ‘multi-employer’ agreements to single-employer bargaining, as 
indeed the Royal Commission had urged (Brown, 1981). Initially they tended to 
prefer to reach agreements with their own workforces in single-employer agreements. 
In multi-plant companies, these single-employer agreements were sometimes at the 
level of the whole company, sometimes of separate divisions within it, and sometimes 
they were at the level of individual workplaces. Later, employer preference tended to 
shift away from dealing with unions at all. Table 4, represented in diagrammatic form 
in Figure 2, shows what happened next.  
 
There is a clear trend after 1984 for firms to continue to bring pay determination ‘in 
house’. This is evident whether pay is fixed by collective bargaining or unilaterally by 
management.  Where collective bargaining was the main pay fixing method, it is 
reflected in the near disappearance of multi-employer bargaining. This shrank at a 
much faster rate than collective bargaining per se so that, by 1998, it was the 
dominant mode of pay setting in only 3 per cent of private sector workplaces in 
Britain. Where workplaces were single and independent (the traditional client of 
employer associations), the proportion covered by multi-employer agreements fell 
from 15 per cent in 1984 to only one per cent in 2004. This is a miniscule level in 
historical terms, bearing in mind that thirty-five years earlier, along with now defunct 
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wages councils, multi-employer agreements had covered something over 60 per cent 
of private sector employees (Milner, 1995: 85). It was a change reflected in the 
decline of their industry-based employer associations. Between 1980 and 2004 the 
proportion of private sector establishments that reported being members of employers 
associations fell from 31 per cent to 13 per cent.  
 
Figure 2 
Locus of decision-making within the main type of pay determination in the private sector
1984 - 2004, by workplace (>24 employees)
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Further analyses revealed that bargaining at more than one level also diminished, 
although the main decline was not until the 1990s, a quarter century after the Royal 
Commission had criticised the practice. Private sector employers appear to have been 
relatively slow to break whole-heartedly away from the apparent comfort of industrial 
agreements. To do so was, after all, to break with long traditions of employer 
solidarity in the face of the trade union challenge.  
 
The nature of the shift to ‘in house’ pay fixing becomes clearer if we separate out 
single, independent establishments from those that are part of larger organisations. 
Workplaces where management fixed pay autonomously at the workplace level, 
expressed as a percentage of all single, independent private sector workplaces, rose 
from 59 per cent in 1984 to 92 per cent in 2004. In other words, in the great majority 
of single-site firms, the fixing of pay has come to be almost universally the task of on-
site management. But in organisations with multiple workplaces there was a tendency 
from the 1990s onwards to shift the locus of decision-making over pay away from the 
workplace. In the 1980s, fixing pay unilaterally at the establishment level was 
reported to be as common as at a higher level in the organisation, but by 2004 it was 
almost twice as likely to be fixed at a higher level. Freed from trade union constraints 
and old worries about their ‘comparability claims’ employers have become both more 
able to respond to the opportunities and pressures of local labour markets, but also 
more able to follow wider corporate strategies.  
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PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
 
Collective bargaining has always been heavily influenced by the nature of the product 
market in which it occurs. The labour market is important insofar as the bargaining 
strength of labour, once organised, is influenced by demand and supply. For a 
particular occupation within a given labour market, an increase in demand for that 
occupation will tend to increase its bargaining strength. The product market has a 
different sort of influence. In a perfectly competitive product market, there is 
theoretically nothing to bargain over; if a union were to force an employer to pay 
above the market clearing wage levels then, unless there were productivity gains not 
available to competitors, that employer would go out of business.  
 
Product markets are, however, rarely perfectly competitive. Employers, to a greater or 
lesser degree, may have some degree of monopoly power by virtue of transport costs, 
brand names, consumer loyalty, patents, or whatever. In such circumstances they are 
in a position to earn supra-normal profits or ‘rents’. Unions can be expected to target 
sectors and firms which have relatively high profits. By organising the workers in 
firms facing relatively light competition, unions seek to win a share of rents. Such a 
share may, for example, be in the form of enhanced pay or of more control over 
manning levels or the conduct of work. Tougher competition in the product market 
poses a fundamental challenge to collective bargaining. This typically arises because 
retailers operating in a given product market get access to producers able to produce a 
particular good or service at lower labour cost, operating in labour markets beyond the 
organising reach of the trade union. Or the firms themselves may relocate to such 
labour markets. Without rents to bargain over, or without the organisational capacity 
to force the employer to concede a share, the union is denied the main economic basis 
of collective bargaining (Brown, 2008). 
 
How far does the changing character of product market competition in Britain explain 
the collapse of collective bargaining that we have described?  The WERS surveys 
since 1984 have asked employers in the private sector various questions about their 
competitive circumstances. One was whether the competition for their main product 
or service was primarily local, regional, national or international. This is a question of 
clear relevance because of the unavoidable geographical constraints on trade union 
organisation, and also because of the historically local origins and loyalties of 
employers’ associations. Model 2 in Table 3 suggests that the probability of using 
collective bargaining was around 11 to 12 per cent higher among employers facing 
local competition than it was among otherwise comparable employers exposed to 
more widespread competition.  
 
Workplaces in non-local product markets are thus significantly less likely to have 
collective bargaining than those in local markets. This reflects the observation of John 
Commons a century ago, that co-operation (or collusion) among employers in the 
management of labour is more feasible when they are in local competition with each 
other. This typically occurs when transport costs are high as a proportion of value 
added, or when the service is provided direct to the consumer (Commons, 1964). But 
this shelter for collective bargaining has been eroding. Analyses for separate years 
revealed the effect had diminished from 15 per cent in 1984 to 8 per cent in 2004. A 
local product market remains a sizeable and statistically significant support for 
collective bargaining, but the support it provides is declining.  Solidarity among 
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employers (as among workers) appears to be getting harder to mobilise, even at the 
local level.v
 
Competition from abroad has presented a challenge to successive British industries 
over the years – textiles, ship-building, coal-mining, footwear, and steel-making are 
just some of the great industries it has almost wiped out. During the post-War years of 
trade union prosperity, those industries that were organised by unions mostly declined 
with their collective bargaining institutions intact, if ultimately ineffective. The 
encroachment of international competition on domestic product markets has increased 
during our twenty-five year period. It is, then, perhaps surprising that the proportion 
of private sector workplaces covered by WERS which reported that their market 
competition derived from international sources was roughly constant – 19 per cent in 
1984 and 15 per cent in 2004.  Furthermore, there was no evidence that international 
competition was more detrimental to the presence of collective bargaining than either 
regional or national competition.  
 
The explanation may be that firms and sectors with earlier exposure to tougher 
competition from overseas were better adapted to the ever-harder competitive 
environment of the 1980s and later. Whether or not they had retained collective 
bargaining, they had fewer adjustments to make. This apparent paradox may also arise 
because competitive pressure can take the form of increased exposure of local firms to 
national and international capital markets, rather than product markets. Ownership is 
increasingly divorced from the locality or country. Company ownership has 
increasingly moved into the hands of institutional shareholders such as pension funds 
and insurance companies, or of foreign shareholders with no particular national 
allegiance. Such owners might be expected to be more demanding than the private 
British shareholders who dominated ownership thirty or forty years earlier. 
Anecdotally this has placed growing pressure on local managers to deliver higher 
rates of return. 
 
Another indicator of the competitive strain under which firms operated during the 
period from 1984 to 2004, wherever they were located geographically, was the 
number of competitors they perceived themselves to have. The surveys suggest that 
collective bargaining was more likely in those firms that claimed they ‘dominated’ the 
market, than those where they reported up to five competitors, and that again was 
greater than where they reported more that six competitors. This is fully consistent 
with our underlying story about the dominance of product market competition. 
Furthermore, the pattern of collapse in the use of collective bargaining also reflected 
these different degrees of competition. Bargaining fell from 50 per cent among 
workplaces that dominated their market in 1984 to 31 per cent among those that 
dominated their market in 2004. But it fell from 51 per cent among workplaces with 
six or more competitors in 1984 to only 15 per cent among workplaces with six or 
more competitors in 2004. In other words, by 2004 those firms that reported that they 
dominated their product markets were around twice as likely to have some collective 
bargaining as those that reported ‘a few’ competitors and those with ‘many’.. Similar 
effects were evident for the percentage of workforces covered by collective 
bargaining. This sensitivity of collective bargaining to the number of the employer’s 
competitors has been observed in previous studies (Metcalf, 2005). That these effects 
cease to be evident when other factors, such as industrial sector, are controlled for, 
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confirms that the competition effect is also closely linked to sectoral and other 
characteristics.  
 
Figure 3: Percentage of employees covered by collective bargaining, by quartiles of 
the industry profit distribution at time of survey 
 
 
 
Source: WERS for collective bargaining coverage; EUKLEMS for industry profits (capital 
compensation) 
 
A third way of exploring the influence of product markets is to see how far changes in 
collective bargaining were related to changes in ‘rents’, for which profitability might 
provide a reasonable proxy. Here we considered not a subjective perception of the 
relevant managers, but sectoral evidence of profitability from official statistics. This is 
provided by the EUKLEMS data set.vi Figure 3 shows the percentage of employees in 
WERS workplaces covered by collective bargaining, as distributed by industrial 
profitability.  Workplaces were divided into quartiles in terms of their industry’s 
location in the profits distribution at the time they were surveyed.  Those in the lowest 
quartile are in the bottom quarter of the industry profits distribution, while those in the 
highest quartile are in the top quarter.   
 
Collective bargaining coverage is clearly more widespread in workplaces with higher 
profits. Figure 3 shows that this effect is broadly evident throughout the period.  This 
supports the view that employers are less resistant to trade unions where there are 
rents to share.  Furthermore, the figure shows that, while collective bargaining 
coverage declined over the period whether profits were at high or at low levels, the 
decline was much less pronounced for the highest quartile.  While on the retreat 
almost everywhere, collective bargaining has retained a foothold longer in those 
workplaces in sectors where profits were highest.  
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Figure 4: percentage of employees covered by collective bargaining in industries 
above and below the median profit per head 
 
 
 
 
Source: WERS for collective bargaining coverage; EUKLEMS for industry profits (capital 
compensation) 
 
Let us use the same data to focus a little more on the dynamics of the profitability 
change and collective bargaining coverage.  In Figure 4 we again distinguish between 
four groups of workplaces, but this time we categorise them according to whether 
they remain in the bottom or top half of the profits distribution over time, or whether 
they remain in the same half of the profits distribution.  As would be expected from 
our earlier discussion, collective bargaining held up best in workplaces in industries 
that have maintained the highest profitability over the period. They include, for 
example, financial intermediation, wholesale trading, and food and drink manufacture. 
Those industries which had consistently low profitability – which include, for 
example, construction and non-electrical machinery manufacture – saw their 
bargaining coverage decline, but at about the average rate. 
 
It is the contrasting experience of industries whose profitability fortunes changed that 
is of particular interest. Both saw collective bargaining decline. But those whose 
relative profitability improved, from being below the median in 1984 to above the 
median in 2004, saw much less of a decline than those whose relative profitability 
declined.  The former, the by 2004 comparatively “nouveau riche” industries - which 
include retail, and legal, technical and advertising services - saw a halving in the 
coverage of collective bargaining between 1984 and 2004. By contrast, those 
experiencing a comparative profits squeeze over the period - which include hotels and 
restaurants, and electrical machinery manufacture - saw bargaining coverage decline 
five-fold. While the revival in profitability in an industry is clearly not enough to 
revive bargaining coverage, profitability collapse does appear to be associated with 
something close to the collapse of collective bargaining. 
 
All this confirms the intimate link between collective bargaining and the fortunes of 
the product markets within which it is conducted. Over our quarter century, collective 
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bargaining has retreated fastest in those workplaces that, relative to others, were in 
product markets with particular competitive characteristics. Their workplaces faced 
more geographically local competition. They confronted more competitors. Their 
industries had lower profit levels. And their industries faced a relative worsening of 
profitability. The growth of collective bargaining in the 20th century had been 
nurtured by imperfect competition. Tightening product market competition has 
suffocated it. 
 
PRIVATISATION – A ‘NATURAL EXPERIMENT’ 
 
A final way of looking at the question of how far product market change accounts for 
the retreat of collective bargaining is to take a very timely ‘natural experiment’. This 
was the privatisation and de-regulation of many industries, almost all of them highly 
unionised industries, over the period under consideration. Between the mid-1980s and 
the late 1990s, at different times but with similar briskness, whole industries were 
exposed to the rigours of private sector competition. What happened to collective 
bargaining? 
 
We got a glimpse of the diversity of response from the broad sectoral divisions in 
Table 2. For the Energy and Water sector, the bulk of privatisations took place in 
1986 in gas, in 1989 in water, and between 1990 and 1998 in electricity. But the 
coverage of all workplaces by collective bargaining remained between 94 and 96 per 
cent throughout. Another major sector affected was Transport and Communication. 
Here privatisation was a more extended process. For air transport it started in 1987, 
with ports following around 1992, buses around 1994, and rail around 1996. 
Telecommunications privatisations were spread from 1984 to 1993. Table 2 shows 
that the coverage of collective bargaining fell, but less than proportionately, from 73 
per cent of workplaces in 1984 to 60 per cent in 1998, rising slightly to 63 per cent in 
2004. The third of the table’s broad sectors affected by privatisation was Other 
Services. Dominated by government, this sector saw a large number of relatively 
small privatisations of research laboratories, regulatory agencies, leasing, property, 
broadcasting and fringe defence operations between 1990 and 2003. And here, by 
contrast, Table 2 shows the fall in coverage in collective bargaining to have been 
disproportionately large, from 86 per cent in 1984 to 53 per cent in 2004. This 
diversity calls for further investigation. Does it undermine our argument concerning 
the role of product market competition in the decline of collective bargaining? 
 
Crucial to answering this question is the fact that privatisation has not been, by any 
means, the royal road to perfectly competitive product markets. There is no necessary 
relationship between private ownership and free markets. Many of the industries sold 
off to the private sector had unavoidable elements of natural monopolies – railways, 
water, gas, electricity, communications, for example.  Their product markets are to 
some extent inherently uncompetitive. Indeed, in acknowledgement of this, all these 
have official regulatory bodies – Ofrail, Ofwat, Ofgem, and Ofcom - committed to 
minimising their abuse of this position.  
 
Providing trade unions could maintain their organisational strength – as they could, 
for example, with the railways, but not with many outsourced civil service operations 
– they could maintain collective bargaining coverage. A private sector natural 
monopoly is potentially at least as vulnerable as a public sector one to being paralysed 
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by a well-organised union. There are, consequently, many privatised firms where 
collective bargaining flourishes. Their aircraft pilots, train drivers, dockers, power 
station workers, refinery technicians, filter-bed staff, telephone engineers, and so on 
remain highly unionised. Their pay and working conditions continue to be fixed by 
collective bargaining, although mostly by a form of collective bargaining less all-
embracing than when their predecessors were nationalised. In summary, the uneven 
fortunes of collective bargaining in the wake of privatisation reflects the uneven 
success of privatisation in eliminating natural monopolies. 
 
Let us now explore the impact of privatisation in greater detail. To identify which 
WERS workplaces belonged to privatised industries we looked at the percentage of 
workplaces that were privately owned in each highly disaggregated industry over 
time. Those moving from predominantly public ownership to largely private 
ownership were classified as ‘privatised’ industries.  This was the case even though 
not all of the workplaces in those industries were privately owned by the end of the 
period. However, in nearly all cases the industry was predominantly publicly owned 
pre-privatisation and was largely privately owned post-privatisation.vii  From this 
information we derived two measures of privatisation.  The first was a dummy 
variable identifying whether a WERS workplace belonged to an industry that was 
privatised over the period.  The second variable distinguished between industries that 
were privatised early in the period (1980-84), those privatised in the middle period 
(1984-1990) and those privatised late on (1990-2004).viii
 
We start with the overall picture. How did privatisation affect collective bargaining in 
the industries affected?  Figure 5 presents the incidence of collective bargaining at 
workplace level for the whole private sector, the whole public sector and for 
workplaces in industries that were privatised over the period. At the outset workplaces 
belonging to industries that were eventually privatised looked more like public sector 
workplaces than they did private sector workplaces in terms of their use of collective 
bargaining.  But during the course of the next two decades collective bargaining 
incidence declined more rapidly in these workplaces in privatised industries than it 
did in the private sector in general.  Decline in the public sector was modest by 
comparison. 
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Figure 5: Percentage of workplaces with any collective bargaining 
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Source: WERS 1984-2004 
 
This clearly suggests that privatisation increased the rate of decline in collective 
bargaining.  To test it more formally we introduced the privatisation indicator into the 
regression analysis reported in Model 1 in Table 3.  The coefficient was negative but 
statistically non-significant.  But when we allowed the privatisation effect to vary by 
year, the analysis revealed a clear time-trend in the privatisation effect.  Allowing for 
other workplace characteristics, workplaces in privatised industries had a higher pre-
privatisation incidence of collective bargaining coverage than other comparable 
workplaces. But the subsequent decline in collective bargaining, after privatisation 
happened, was greater than it was for other, unaffected workplaces between 1990 and 
2004, as is suggested by Figure 5.  The impact of privatisation on collective 
bargaining was relatively slow to emerge, coming through after 1990. This may 
reflect the fact that many privatisations were occurring around that time, while some 
still had to take effect, and it is to be expected that there was a lag between 
privatisation and changes in the new owner’s collective bargaining policy. It may also 
reflect the fact that the early privatisations focused primarily on changing the 
ownership of assets without necessarily changing the structure of markets; a 
recognition of the importance of market liberalisation only after this initial wave 
(Barrell and Pain, 2002: 36).  
 
Analyses for single years tell the same story.  In 1990, workplaces belonging to those 
industries targeted for privatisation were about 10 per cent more likely to have 
collective bargaining than otherwise comparable workplaces.  By 1998 there was no 
statistical difference between workplaces in privatised industries and other 
workplaces.  However, by 2004 the full effect had come through. Workplaces in 
privatised industries had a 10 per cent lower probability of collective bargaining than 
unaffected workplaces when controlled for other observable differences. Far from the 
public sector traditions of collectivism living on after privatisation, there seems to 
have been an adverse reaction against them by management.  
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Figure 6: Percentage of workplaces with any collective bargaining, public sector 
versus privatised sector 
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We address the timing of industry privatisations more directly in Figure 6.  This 
compares the incidence of collective bargaining in the whole public sector with its 
incidence in privatised industries, distinguishing between early, mid-period and late 
privatisations.  We see again that the percentage of workplaces using collective 
bargaining for at least some of their employees has remained high in the public sector 
throughout the period.  In contrast, privatised industries have seen substantial declines 
in collective bargaining coverage.  But the patterns differ according to the timing of 
privatisation.  First, it is apparent that early privatisations up to 1984 were targeted on 
industries with relatively low collective bargaining incidence.ix Examples would be 
British Petroleum, Associated British Ports, and Cable and Wireless. As privatisation 
progressed, so the government shifted its focus to politically tougher industries with 
higher levels of collective bargaining. For example, British Aerospace, British Gas, 
British Airways, Rolls Royce, British Airports Authority, British Steel and the water 
boards followed in the years to 1989. After 1990, major privatisations included the 
electricity industry, British Telecommunications, the coal industry, and the railways. 
Privatisation was pushed deeper and deeper into traditional heartlands of collective 
bargaining. 
 
It is notable that coverage of collective bargaining among workplaces located in 
industries that were privatised in the 1980s continued to fall throughout the 1990s.   It 
is also apparent from Figure 6 that collective bargaining incidence was already in 
decline in late-privatised industries prior to their privatisation. It is possible that this 
reflects employers’ anticipation of privatisation.  The post-privatisation decline in the 
coverage of collective bargaining in the later privatised industries has been less steep 
than the decline that occurred shortly after privatisation in the earlier privatised 
industries. But the incidence of collective bargaining in industries privatised in the 
1980s appears to have stabilized since New Labour returned to power in 1997.   
Employers’ treatment of trade unions has always been sensitive to their perceptions of 
government attitudes.  New Labour may have sought to avoid looking too friendly 
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toward unions, but their ‘arms length’ approach was undeniably more tolerant than 
that of their Conservative predecessors. This evidence suggests that New Labour’s 
arrival reduced the destructive effect of privatisation on collective bargaining. 
 
Table 5: Incidence of collective bargaining coverage, comparing workplaces in 
privatised industries with those in the public sector, OLS 
 
 pooled 1984 1990 1998 2004 
When privatised 
(ref: always 
public) 
     
1980-1984 -0.230 0.035 -0.073 -0.429 -0.406 
 (4.20)** (0.46) (0.46) (4.99)** (3.42)** 
1984-1990 -0.127 -0.099 0.143 -0.204 -0.233 
 (4.25)** (2.72)** (2.42)* (2.09)* (4.18)** 
1990-2004 -0.058 -0.098 0.208 -0.099 -0.403 
 (1.37) (1.69) (2.65)** (1.84) (2.71)** 
wirs1990 -0.107     
 (3.64)**     
wirs1998 -0.170     
 (6.12)**     
wirs2004 -0.196     
 (6.80)**     
Constant 0.813 0.811 0.583 0.705 0.763 
 (13.57)** (9.18)** (4.01)** (5.75)** (6.68)** 
Observations 2932 788 675 786 683 
R-squared 0.36 0.43 0.36 0.42 0.42 
Note: Models include controls for region (10 dummies), industry (9 dummies), foreign ownership, 
proportion part-time employees.   
 
How robust are these findings about the adverse effect of privatisation on collective 
bargaining? We carried out additional regression analyses in which we replaced the 
dummy variable for privatisation with a variable distinguishing between the three 
phases of privatisation identified in Figure 6. Those workplaces in sectors that 
remained in the private sector throughout the period were dropped from the analysis.  
The results are presented in Table 5.  It confirms that, throughout the period, 
workplaces in privatised industries were less likely to have used collective bargaining 
compared with ‘like’ workplaces in industries that remained publicly owned 
throughout. More importantly, Table 5 sheds some light on the timing of privatisation 
effects. The effects of early privatisation (1980-84) were not significant in the 1990 
survey, but became statistically significant by 1998 and persisted into 2004. There is a 
negative association between mid-period privatisation (1984-1990) and collective 
bargaining incidence in 1984, consistent either with a rapid privatisation effect or else 
a pre-existing lower coverage differential in these workplaces relative to their public 
sector counterparts.  In any event, the negative effect had doubled by the late 1990s 
and persisted into 2004. In the case of late privatisations (1990-2004), despite having 
a fairly high probability of bargaining at the outset in 1990, their probabilities of 
bargaining incidence were 40 per cent lower than those of comparable public sector 
workplaces by 2004.  
 
In summary, there can be no doubting that privatisation has been a major contributor 
to the decline of collective bargaining. It has done this by exposing hitherto sheltered 
industries to increased product market competition. It is true that collective bargaining 
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does live on in some privatised sectors, but the main reason for that is that those 
sectors enjoy natural monopolies. The experience of privatisation reinforces our over-
riding argument, that collective bargaining in Britain has been eroded by increasing 
product market competition.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This has been the story of the decline of the principal means of protecting labour 
standards in Britain. Collective bargaining developed over the twentieth century as a 
result of employers’ being able to compromise with organised labour. They could do 
this so long as the markets in which they traded were sufficiently imperfect in their 
competition. In this study we have used the unique data of the WERS to demonstrate 
that tougher competition has undermined this tacit settlement between employers and 
their employees’ trade unions. Labour standards in the modern workplace have 
become more vulnerable as a result. 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
i For instance, import penetration of the British domestic manufacturing market more than doubled, 
from 25 per cent to 58 per cent, between 1980 and 2004. 
ii The data on collective bargaining from the 1980 WIRS are not comparable with those from later 
surveys in the series, so our series here begins in 1984. 
iii Although superficially at variance with the finding of Kersley  et al. (2006:188) that the rate of 
decline was slowing, their analysis did not take account of the other variables included in our analysis. 
iv This figure is based on employees working in workplaces with at least 25 employees.  Coverage is 
lower in smaller workplaces (Kersley et al., 2006: 179-183). 
v This result is not sensitive to the inclusion of variables capturing the number of competitors the 
establishment faces. 
vi The data set contains financial information collected from official national data sources for 71 two-
digit industries over the period 1970-2004.  For further information go to: http://www.euklems.net/. In 
our analyses we use (value added – labour costs)/employment to proxy industry profitability for the 51 
industries common to EUKLEMS and WERS. The principal limitation of this measure is that it takes 
no account of capital depreciation, which will vary across industries with different levels of capital 
intensity. However, it is not possible to make such an adjustment with the basic EUKLEMS data. We 
gratefully acknowledge the advice provided by Ana Rincon-Aznar on the use of EUKLEMS.  
vii The exceptions were construction, road haulage and property which were predominantly privately 
owned at the outset but became almost exclusively privately owned 
viii We coded our data at 4-digit SIC level.  The time-series data contains SIC 1980 codes for all years 
except 1998 when we conducted the same exercise using SIC 1992 codes.  The industries identified as 
privatised were: electricity generation; gas supply; water supply; chemicals manufacture; shipbuilding; 
train manufacture; aerospace; construction; railways; bus and coach services; road haulage; supporting 
services to sea transport (including docks); supporting services to air transport (including British 
Airports Authority and CAA); telecommunications; real estate; refuse collection and street cleaning; 
higher education; hospitals; social/residential homes; community services (including tourist offices).   
WERS does not contain some industries that were privatised such as coal mining.  The timing of 
privatisations corresponds with other sources such as the privatization barometer 
(http://www.privatizationbarometer.net/database/php). 
ix Because Figure 5 suggests some delay in the impact of privatisation, we take the 1984 level as 
indicative of the extent of bargaining before privatisations began for the 1980-84 group. 
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